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IntroductIon
We often wonder about our own identity in the different 
facets of our lives. Who are we? How do others see us? 
What are we like in terms of our family or jobs? We require 
an integral and fully constituted identity and for this, 
whether or not we are recognised seems to matter. At least, 
that is the argument put forward by the philosopher Axel 
Honneth, to whom I will refer in this paper.
My goal in this paper1 is to study the theory of recogni-
tion, especially as espoused by Axel Honneth, in order to 
determine its importance in peaceful conflict transforma-
tion. My starting point is that the experience of mutual rec-
ognition contributes in several positive ways to the peace-
ful conflict transformation process. However, I believe it 
is necessary to clarify certain points of Honneth’s theory 
of mutual recognition. Consequently, this paper is divided 
into two sections: 1) Struggle for recognition and the shap-
ing of human identity; and 2) Contributions of mutual rec-
ognition to peaceful conflict transformation.
1. Struggle for recognItIon 
and the ShapIng 
of human IdentIty
Our capacity to recognise and our desire to be 
recognised as individuals are crucial to how human 
relationships develop. That is why maintaining personal 
artIcle







Why do we tend to use violence to deal with our conflicts? This is one of the questions we often ask ourselves when we 
become aware of this tendency to deal with conflict situations we experience in everyday life. In response, we claim that 
it is easier to use violence, that there is no other way to do things or that we are simply used to acting that way. But are 
we right? This paper challenges these claims, arguing that there are several alternatives to regulate conflicts and that we 
have the capacity and means to do so peacefully. The key is to accustom ourselves to rebuilding our peaceful abilities and 
to strive to implement new, non-violent habits. To this end, peaceful conflict transformation is presented as the preferred 
method for positive conflict regulation, and its main characteristics are discussed. Special emphasis is placed on the value 
of mutual recognition based on an analysis of Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition, which reaffirms the role played by 
recognition in shaping human identity. 
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relationships constantly requires this skill and this desire, 
regardless of the sphere in which the relationships exist. 
One might look, for example, at the case of the person who 
needs to recognise and be recognised to be successful in 
their career; the wife or mother who has to recognise and 
be recognised by her husband and her children to ensure 
the smooth functioning of her family life; the individual 
who must recognise and be recognised by his or her friends 
to be respected and form part of the group; or any one of 
us who seeks to recognise and be recognised in any of our 
identities. When we cross the street, hail a taxi or buy some 
doughnuts, we have the need to recognise the people we 
meet and the desire to be recognised by them.
Etymologically, ‘recognition’ means to discover or get 
to know something or someone again, derived from the 
Latin verb cognōscĕre (“to know”, Corominas, 1961, p. 162) 
and the prefix ‘re’. Accordingly, this act of getting to know 
again opens up the possibility of seeing the people we meet 
throughout our lives with new eyes, focussing on traits and 
aspects that we had more or less ignored earlier on. That 
is when we hope to receive the same recognition from the 
other person, becoming aware of what characteristics we 
have in common as human beings and what differentiates 
us. This idea brings to mind the work of the political scien-
tist Hannah Arendt (2005), who emphasised the plurality 
and equality of human beings when reflecting on the possi-
bility we have to exercise power in a concerted fashion and 
on new ways to engage in politics in accordance with this 
power. The act of recognition helps us see what we have in 
common (equality) and what distinguishes us (plurality), 
to understand each other in general terms, as members of 
the human race, and specifically, as individuals.
This paper aims to take an in-depth look at mutual rec-
ognition and not at recognition in any other sense of the 
term. Ricoeur (2005, p. 29) clearly distinguishes some of 
these senses when he writes that they can be ordered as if 
they were a process, running from the active voice (recog-
nise) to the passive voice (be recognised). He proposes a se-
quence of recognition as identification, recognising oneself 
and mutual recognition. In my view, the latter is the one 
that most clearly demonstrates the necessary contact be-
tween people, so crucial in shaping our identity as human 
beings, the value of intersubjectivity in our personal and in-
terpersonal fulfilment (Martínez Guzmán, 2005; 2009).
The role of mutual recognition in the shaping of human 
identity has been studied, in particular, by Axel Honneth, 
a philosopher from the third generation of the Frankfurt 
School. Honneth has expressly devoted his work to formu-
lating a theory of recognition, which, for him, must explain 
many of the social practices responsible for the pathology 
of human reason (Honneth 2009, p. 7). In fact, this is one 
of the theses being put forward by the third generation of 
the Frankfurt School when it claims that certain current 
social practices are causing a pathological deformation of 
human reason. Building on this argument, Honneth un-
derscores the value of reciprocal recognition to combat 
these social practices and argues that ‘successful’ experi-
ences of mutual recognition could generate a change with 
a view to redirecting our minds towards a greater under-
standing of ourselves, of the people around us and of the 
situations and events taking place in our environment. I 
believe that the violent events reported daily by the me-
dia are examples of these social practices that lead to the 
pathological deformation of human reason. Our society is 
full of all kinds of interpersonal and international conflicts, 
which are proof of the current social injustice resulting 
from the use of violence in certain actions. According to 
Honneth’s theory, the ‘successful’ experience of reciprocal 
recognition allows us to confront these situations using the 
alternative resource linked to our capacity to look at other 
people in order to understand them, to recognise them, to 
see what they are thinking and feeling. Only then can we 
stop and think about what is going through our classmate’s 
mind before using violence against her; about what our 
neighbour is thinking before launching an attack against 
them; and about what our family is feeling before attack-
ing them, even if only verbally. Of course, mutual recogni-
tion is not the only resource available to deal with these 
unjust situations, and it usually needs to be combined with 
mechanisms such as cooperation, effective communication 
and accountability. But its presence is necessary to help us 
see others not as simple objects in front of us, but rather as 
people who we must learn to share our experiences with, 
whether positive or negative.2
This means that Honneth’s philosophy that reciprocal 
recognition is the core of social life (Basaure, 2008, p. 62) 
generates “al mismo tiempo, una continuidad y una ruptura 
con los intelectuales de la primera generación de dicha es-
cuela3 y, en menor medida, aunque igualmente evidente, con 
su antecesor directo, Jürgen Habermas.”4 (Basaure, 2008, p. 
59). Honneth attributes the same role to recognition that 
Habermas attributes to communication. For Honneth, the 
shaping of human identity depends on the degree to which 
and the way we are recognised (Honneth, 1997). This is 
true to the extent that, for him, those social groups that do 
not feel sufficiently recognised set up social movements to 
2 Here, the adjective ‘negative’ need not be understood as ‘violent’, but rather as an experience with another person that may not have been favourable for one or both of the 
parties, but in which violence was not necessarily used. It is well known that we experience displeasure in our interpersonal relationships when things do not go well, even 
when we have not resorted to violence.
3  The author is using the term ‘that school’ to refer to the first generation of the Frankfurt School.
4 “a continuity of and a rupture with the intellectuals of the first generation of that school and, to a lesser extent, but equally clearly, with his direct predecessor, Jürgen 
Habermas.”
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channel struggles for recognition. This is where Honneth 
revives the ‘struggles for recognition’ previously examined 
by Hegel, placing the quest for mutual recognition at the 
centre, as it is both the cause and the desired outcome of 
these struggles. Consequently, according to Honneth, the 
interpretation of any social demand should be based on 
the struggle for recognition, even when dealing with a sin-
gle individual who has the need to enhance the way he or 
she is being recognised. In accordance with this view, what 
truly motivates society and its agents is the possibility of 
being recognised in all one’s facets. It is when this does not 
occur that the need to struggle to achieve the longed-for 
recognition arises.
I would like to take a brief look at the concept of strug-
gle used in Honneth’s theory. Ricoeur, (2005, p. 227) has 
complemented the use of the concept in this theory with 
the expression of ‘states of peace’, to give it a more positive 
meaning. Thus, he argues that “la alternativa a la idea de 
lucha en el proceso de reconocimiento mutuo hay que bus-
carla en experiencias pacíficas de reconocimiento mutuo”.5 
It is true that struggle can be used with various meanings, 
but, in a figurative sense, it can be understood as the vigor-
ous effort an individual or group makes to achieve some-
thing or make something happen without necessarily us-
ing violence. This is how I interpret the word within the 
framework of Honneth’s theory, as I do not believe he is ad-
vocating violent struggle to achieve experiences of mutual 
recognition, but advocates the primacy of experiences of 
mutual recognition as the core of social life so that struggles 
can be conducted peacefully without the use of violence. In 
reality, there have been many social movements that have 
managed their struggles non-violently and exhibited the 
characteristics that Honneth cites in his theory. 
Having made this clarification, I will now turn to how 
Honneth structures his theory, which is based on three 
types of mutual recognition, originating from three types 
of disrespect (Honneth, 1997).
Recognition of physical integrity, linked to the attitude 1) 
of love and the value of self-confidence.
Recognition of people as members of a legal commu-2) 
nity with rights and obligations, linked to the attitude 
of respect and the value of self-respect.
Recognition of different ways of life, linked to the at-3) 
titude of solidarity and the value of self-esteem.
Each of the three types of recognition is related to one 
of the defining facets characterising the human condition. 
The shaping of human identity depends on fulfilment, that 
is, whether a person feels recognised with regard to their 
physical integrity, as a member of a legal community and 
with regard to their specific way of life. At least, that is what 
Honneth (1997) notes when he claims that human integrity 
owes its existence to experiences of mutual recognition and 
that, therefore, all people need to feel recognised in all three 
of the aforementioned ways in order to feel fully realised.
Based on this interpretation of mutual recognition as 
a shaper of human identity, Honneth classifies the three 
types of recognition as if he were dealing with a process. He 
places recognition of physical integrity first, referring to the 
reciprocal recognition for an understanding of our physi-
cal appearance. According to Honneth, these experiences 
of recognition take place as a result of the attitude of love, 
although here this is understood not only in the “sentido 
limitado que el concepto ha tomado desde la valoración ro-
mántica de la relación sexual”6 (Honneth 1997, p.117), but 
in a broader sense “[…] el amor representa el primer estadio 
de reconocimiento recíproco, ya que en su culminación los 
sujetos recíprocamente se confirman en su naturaleza nece-
sitada y se reconocen como entes de necesidad”7 (Honneth 
1997, p.118). Thus, here “[…] el amor debe concebirse como 
un ser-si-mismo en el otro”8 (Honneth 1997, p.118), which 
is a lifelong need.
The experience of this mutual recognition encour-
ages the value of self-confidence, that is, of people feeling 
greater confidence in themselves. Needless to say, when we 
see ourselves physically recognised and valued, we feel bet-
ter. However, when this is not the case, we find the type of 
disrespect that prevents the smooth development of this 
reciprocal recognition and is linked to restrictions in our 
ability to use our own body freely. This situation occurs 
when, for example, a woman is prohibited from using her 
own body due to the control exerted over her by a male.
Second, Honneth (1997) turns to our recognition as 
members of a legal community with rights and obligations 
in order to describe the type of mutual recognition that 
emphasises legal relationships:
“En el ‘reconocimiento jurídico’, […], se expresa que 
todo sujeto humano, sin diferencia alguna, debe valer 
como ‘un fin en sí mismo’, mientras que el ‘respeto social’ 
pone de relieve el valor de un individuo, en la medida 
en que se puede medir con criterios de relevancia 
social. En el primer caso, como muestra el empleo de la 
fórmula Kantiana, estamos ante el respeto universal de 
la ‘libertad de la voluntad de la persona’; en el segundo, 
por el contrario, ante el reconocimiento de realizaciones 
individuales, cuyo valor se mide por el grado en que 
5 “the alternative to the idea of struggle in the process of mutual recognition must be sought in peaceful experiences of mutual recognition.”
6 “restricted sense that the concept has acquired since Romanticism’s revaluation of intimate sexual relationships.”
7  “[…] love represents the first stage of reciprocal recognition, because in it subjects mutually confirm each other with regard to the concrete nature of their needs.”
8 “[…] love has to be understood as  ‘being oneself in another’.”
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una sociedad las experimenta como significativas.”9 
(Honneth 1997, pp.137-138)
Therefore:
“[...] en los dos casos un hombre es respetado a causa 
de determinadas capacidades, pero, en el primero, se 
trata de aquella cualidad general que le constituye como 
persona, y en el segundo, por el contrario, de cualidades 
particulares que le caracterizan a diferencia de otras 
personas.”10 (Honneth 1997, p.139)
This form of mutual recognition entails the under-
standing that all people are entitled to be part of a legal 
community with the ensuing rights and obligations. That is 
how the value of self-respect is generated in a person, as in-
dividuals clearly also feel more respected and better about 
themselves when they feel they are part of a given com-
munity. Where this is not the case, it is due to disrespect 
preventing such membership and the subject’s exclusion 
from society becomes clear. For example, these excluding 
attitudes are present in the ways that certain people and 
institutions treat people from other countries, especially 
the poor. In reality, the treatment of those who emigrate 
from their countries hoping to find better living conditions 
elsewhere often leaves a lot to be desired, which encourages 
the type of disrespect discussed here.
Finally, Honneth includes recognition of different ways 
of life, by which he means our capacity to show solidarity 
towards lifestyles that are different from our own. Not eve-
ryone has to live the same way, like the same music or have 
the same cultural or religious traditions. We must learn to 
respect, value and understand those who do not live the 
way we do, but certain minimum standards with regard 
to respect for basic human rights must be enforced. These 
are laid down in the Minimum Ethics designed by Cor-
tina (1992), although we must take into account the princi-
ples of cordial reason described in one of her more recent 
books (Cortina, 2007). Acting this way leads to enhanced 
self-esteem, as we also usually feel better about ourselves 
when we realise that our way of life is accepted. Otherwise, 
we show disrespect for other people’s habits, which, while 
different, are just as valid as our own.11
Going through these three states of mutual recogni-
tion results in human integrity and, therefore, generates 
the yearned-for struggle to achieve mutual recognition.
Honneth’s philosophical theory on mutual recognition 
has taken on dramatic importance today, to such an extent 
that it has been questioned in other studies of this issue. It 
has even been debated alongside Nancy Fraser’s theory of 
social justice in the book ¿Redistribución o reconocimiento? 
Un debate político-filosófico (Fraser and Honneth, 2006). 
The Spanish edition of this book, which I cite here, clearly 
shows that Honneth starts from an intersubjective inter-
pretation of mutual recognition, whereas Fraser’s work is 
based on a much more sociological view. For Honneth, 
people shape their identities based on intersubjective rela-
tionships of mutual recognition, whereas in Fraser’s view, 
recognition is linked to social structures from which one 
must work to encourage the recognition of all people. In 
this case, to prevent instances of disrespect that give rise to 
a lack of recognition, one must transform social structures 
that have already been institutionalised (Zurn, 2003). This 
is why Fraser notes that social justice also depends on re-
distribution policies and not just recognition (Fraser and 
Honneth, 2006), while Honneth, as discussed above, places 
the full burden on mutual recognition.
2. contrIbutIonS of 
mutual recognItIon 
to peaceful conflIct 
tranSformatIon
The presence of conflict in contemporary society was 
already hinted at in the previous section. We experience 
all kinds of interpersonal conflicts, constantly featured in 
the media alongside news about armed conflicts and acts 
of terrorism affecting hundreds of thousands of people. 
People appear to be conflictive, even if this does not mean 
that we are naturally violent. There is no denying the 
existence of myriad conflicts or the fact that most of them 
are dealt with violently; however, it is also true that we have 
the skills and capacity to regulate them through peaceful 
means (Martínez Guzmán, 2005, 2009). The problem is 
that we have become used to using violence to regulate 
our conflict experiences, and it is now quite difficult for 
us to spend the time required to learn alternative means, 
even if we understand that it is increasingly necessary to 
start doing so. 
9 “[In] ‘legal recognition’, the idea is expressed that every human subject must be considered an ‘end in itself ’, whereas ‘social regard’ emphasises the ‘worth’ of an individual, 
insofar as it can be measured according to criteria of social relevance. As the use of the Kantian formulation indicates, we are dealing in the first case with universal respect 
for the ‘freedom of the will of the person’, and in the second case, by contrast, with the recognition of individual achievements, whose value is measured by the degree to 
which society deems them significant.”
10 “[...] In both cases, human beings are respected because of certain traits. In the first, however, this is a matter of the general feature that makes them persons at all, 
whereas in the second case, it is a matter of the particular characteristics that distinguish them from other persons.”
11 It should be noted that the validity of the actions advocated here is always subject to the theories of interculturalism and the minimum values entailed in respect for basic 
human rights.
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To implement this change in mentality and lay down 
new habits, we can begin by considering the thesis put for-
ward by Muñoz (2001), whereby it is not conflict itself that is 
negative or positive but rather the means we use to address 
it. If this is true, we only need to use peaceful alternatives to 
deal with our conflicts and prevent their most destructive 
consequences. Through the use of peaceful means we can 
learn to live with our conflicts, without the incessant need 
to put an end to them and without the fear of experienc-
ing them. I would argue that conflicts can be interpreted as 
situations inherent in human relationships and that they 
encourage social changes when they are managed peace-
fully. Awareness of this interpretation, will not only allow 
us to accustom ourselves to seeing conflicts as part of our 
lives and as situations that, with effort and dedication, can 
be peacefully transformed but, will also prompt us to seek 
alternative methods to manage them.
Conflict transformation by peaceful means is one of 
these alternative methods, enjoying considerable success 
today, as witnessed by its use in most of the studies con-
ducted at different research centres devoted to the study 
of these issues. Conflict studies previously used the terms 
‘conflict resolution’ and ‘conflict management’. The new 
name emphasises the value of the use of peaceful means 
for conflict transformation.
Conflict resolution emerged in the 1950s, empha-
sising the importance of ending conflicts ‘at all costs’ by 
underscoring their destructive consequences. Obviously, 
the fact that this method emphasises the harmful effects 
a conflict situation can have and presents it in a negative 
light makes us want to end it by any means. This aspi-
ration gave rise to a host of criticism, beginning in the 
1960s, when scholars began to question the need to re-
solve all conflicts and whether this need might not lead, 
in many cases, to a disregard for the criteria of justice 
(Lederach, 1995).
This questioning led to the emergence, in the 1970s, 
of the term: conflict management. This method has not 
been as successful, apparently heavily influenced by both 
the theory and practical aspects of business management. 
This management view proposed a more positive view of 
conflicts, although it continued to emphasise their destruc-
tive consequences. Its ties to business management led to a 
wide range of criticism beginning in the 1980s.
The theory of peaceful conflict transformation 
emerged in the 1990s, and has been quite successful from 
a methodological point of view, as noted above, although 
less so from a terminological one, as most research centres 
do not use this expression, but rather talk about conflict 
resolution.
The field of peaceful conflict transformation has given 
rise to an understanding of these experiences as situations 
that can be peacefully transformed, with studies on human 
beings’ capacities and abilities to deal with conflicts in al-
ternative ways, without resorting to the use of violence. The 
most important thing is to understand the tensions that 
caused a conflict, firstly to confront them and, secondly, to 
overcome them, generating new goals with the aim of en-
suring the continuity of our relationships in the future (Fi-
sas, 1998). This entails effort, dedication and – why not say 
it – both physical and psychological suffering, since, even 
in the absence of violence, people still suffer when they 
realise that the regulation process is not going smoothly 
or is dragging on without any agreement being reached 
(París Albert, 2009). Therefore, peaceful conflict transfor-
mation cannot be understood in an idealistic way, where 
everything goes smoothly, but rather must be interpreted 
as a difficult path that requires those taking it to contribute 
with all their willpower and commitment.
This commitment requires the responsibility to act 
by peaceful means and according to criteria of justice; 
to understand what other people are thinking and feel-
ing; to see the conflict as a shared problem that must be 
addressed jointly if the goal is to reach communicative 
agreement; and to prioritise shared rather than individual 
interests. In short, I would argue, the responsibility to im-
plement the following values (París Albert, 2009): 1) co-
operation with other people (Rapoport, 1992); 2) empa-
thetic perception of what the other parties feel and think 
about the conflict (Fisher et. al, 1999); 3) the ability to 
make use of new forms of integrative power, whilst avoid-
ing forms of an authoritarian and subordinating nature 
(Boulding, 1993); 4) communication based on criteria of 
equality and freedom to reach communicative agreements 
leading to linguistic understanding (Cortina, 1985; Hab-
ermas, 1987); and 5) empowerment as the reconstruction 
of our capacity to deal with our conflicts without the need 
for help from other people12 (Bush and Folger, 1994). It 
is important to mention here that Bush and Folger also 
talk about recognition, emphasizing this mechanism for 
peaceful conflict transformation. Therefore, these two au-
thors would fit in the framework of the theoretical con-
tents of this article.
Mutual recognition is among these values, as one aris-
ing from the commitment to peaceful conflict transforma-
tion. I have sought to give it a stronger presence in this 
paper due to its role in the shaping of human identity, ac-
cording to the theory of Honneth (1997), and due to the 
contribution that it can make to the positive regulation of 
conflict situations.
12 Notwithstanding this proposal of a capacity for empowerment, it must be borne in mind that the peaceful transformation of a conflict may require the assistance of a third 
party to mediate and serve as a ‘facilitator’. In other words, the mediating party does not offer solutions, but rather guides the parties involved in the process. Therefore, 
the concept of mediation is not contrary to empowerment as proposed here, as it nevertheless involves a reconstruction of powers to allow the affected parties to reach the 
necessary agreements.
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contribution of recognition to peaceful conflict transformation
recognition of physical integrity
1) revaluation of the body and 
of its channels of communication
2) revaluation of feelings
recognition as members of a 
legal community and holders of 
rights and obligations
1) revaluation of Kant’s theory 
of respect and, to a certain 
extent, of his cosmopolitan law
recognition of different 
lifestyles
1) revaluation of specific ways 
of living life, subject to minimum 
ethical standards and theories of 
interculturalism
Recognition of physical integrity recalls one of the 
theses put forward in the phenomenological tradition by, 
in particular, Merleau-Ponty (1975), in which the human 
body is the intermediary between the self and the world. It 
is possible to say that a person observes the things around 
from the position of their body and that their perception 
depends on this position. An example might help to clarify 
this idea. We know that the perception of the world is dif-
ferent between those, for example, in Mexico and Spain. In 
Europe, many lifestyles found in other parts of the world 
are not understood: the world is understood based on how 
it is perceived, which depends on the location of the body. 
The value of perception again makes an appearance, as we 
must learn to change the angle of our bodies (change our 
perceptions) in order to understand what other people 
think and feel and thereby successfully bring about peace-
ful conflict transformation.
Two additional aspects allow us to reach this type of 
mutual recognition. The first is body language channels, the 
external aspect of gestures, eye contact, the sense of touch 
and distance to other bodies (Borisoff and Víctor, 1991). 
This implies that the body is also recognised as a source 
of communication. The second is that of feelings, which 
are beginning to hold a decisive position and cease to be 
subordinate to reason (Martínez Guzmán, 2005). Peaceful 
conflict transformation is highly dependent on the way we 
feel. Furthermore, it is very important to take into account 
the revaluation of traumatic experiences, which are very 
physical and produce lots of feelings that will influence our 
future experiences and our participation in future proc-
esses of peaceful conflict transformation. 
This means that education in feelings to train us to ‘feel 
positively’ is advisable, without allowing ourselves to get 
carried away by excessively favourable feelings in the face 
of violence. This education refers to making people more 
aware of their feelings so that they have the ability: 1) to 
not be influenced by their feelings, so that they can avoid 
the negative consequences that these feelings can produce 
in themselves, in other people or in nature; 2) to transform 
negative feelings into positive ones; 3) to realize the rel-
evance of positive feelings in life if we want to have a peace-
ful world and want to put into practice the methodology of 
peaceful conflict transformation.
Recognition as members of a legal community and 
holders of rights and obligations allows us to revive some 
of the ideas proposed by Kant (1985) in his theory of re-
spect (some have been mentioned in the previous section) 
and, to a certain extent, his cosmopolitan law, which con-
tains two theses that I would like to mention here. Firstly, 
that no human being is more entitled to be at any given 
point of the planet for the mere fact of having been born 
there; and secondly, that any violation of a right anywhere 
in the world affects all other points.
Keeping these two theses in mind when implement-
ing peaceful conflict transformation will help to forestall 
many of the conflicts that arise as a result of disregard for 
this second type of mutual recognition. For example, it will 
allow us to deal more easily and peacefully with conflicts 
relating to migration, already discussed in the second sec-
tion of this paper.13
The recognition of different ways of life will favour the 
revaluation of those lifestyles that do not match our own. 
This will allow us to take into account theories of intercul-
turalism, which emphasise learning between different 
cultures, strengthening the positive aspects of each one. 
At the same time, it reminds us of the minimum ethical 
standards that promote certain minimum standards of jus-
tice that must always be applied (Cortina, 1992), although 
without forgetting our sentimental rationality, as already 
seen in relation to the first type of recognition (Cortina, 
2007; Martínez Guzmán, 2005; París Albert, 2009).
concluSIon
This paper presents a synthesis of the different contributions 
mutual recognition makes to peaceful conflict transformation, 
highlighting some, and taking into account the general 
characteristics of this method of positive regulation of 
conflict situations. Honneth’s theory of mutual recognition 
was the starting point, leading to an understanding of these 
experiences of mutual recognition (human relations) as 
basic to the shaping of human identity.
The ideas set forth in this paper offer insight into the 
words of Vinyamata (2003, p. 9):
“La labor de un conflictólogo, aunque resulte paradójico 
decirlo, se centra en la paz, en la felicidad, no en el 
13 Migration also involves the third type of recognition proposed by Honneth, although here I have used it only to exemplify the second type of recognition according to his 
theory.
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conflicto. El oficio del conflictólogo consiste en facilitar, no 
dar, la solución a los conflictos, procurando la dignidad, 
la libertad y el bienestar integral de las personas y de 
las sociedades; la vida en serenidad y armonía con uno 
mismo y en relación al entorno.”14
The value of mutual recognition is implicit in this quo-
tation if we take into account that conflict specialists will 
need to promote recognition if they want to achieve the 
“dignity, freedom and comprehensive welfare of people 
and societies”. 
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